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ABSTRACT 
The intellectual act of imposing borders to contain and delimit objects has been 
a constituent factor in physics since its origins, and is also fundamental for 
philosophical reflection. However, the characteristics of the conceptual universe 
thus constructed (tendency towards the ideal limit, invariance in variation, a 
conception of matter as residue, etc.) seem inadequate in biology. The essential 
characteristic of the living thing is, in fact, that of having a history: that is, of 
being the concrete trace of a memory. Making an epistemology of the living thing 
(and not of the inert) means identifying new categories which, being radically 
antithetical to disembodied notions like that of program and information, take 
account of the unpredictability and creativity which time introduces. This essay 
aims to bring some of these fundamental categories into focus. 
1. The Line and the Idea 
In mathematics the notion of “structure” is central. Consider for example the 
notion of line. The line, as length without thickness (Euclid’s definition beta), 
and the sign-point are the “structures” at the historical origin of geometry, the 
originating objects of Western mathematics in its relation to space; limited 
objects, outside the world, but which at the same time organise, shape and 
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measure the world. The sign (semeion), marks a position on a line, is at the 
extremities of a segment (definition gamma). Its spatial interpretation (that 
which does not have parts, definition alpha) comes later and turns out to be 
derivable: it is the intersection of two lines without thickness (theorem 1, 
chapter 1). The line without thickness is remote from any sensible experience, 
even though, in the act of tracing the line, its contiguity with that experience is 
implicit: it highlights the sense of movement, of trajectory, of an “edge” or 
mathematical “border” (Longo 2016). 
In fact, the notion of line produces and results from that of border. All the 
figures of Greek geometry are constructed from continuous lines which 
intersect one another: they are therefore given by their borders alone, which 
allows the calculation of surfaces – if the border has a thickness, what then would 
the surface be? It is the correlation with philosophy, and especially with the 
Platonic Ideas, which allows this miracle: the invention of mathematics as a 
science of limits, a geometry of pure outlines, of lengths and borders, which can 
be numerically irrational, or rather beyond the arithmetical logos. As asymptotic 
notions, π and the square root of 2 have meaning only in a geometry of lines 
without thickness. Mathematics is not exclusively the discovery of proof, but also 
a practice of structures remote from the sensible world. These gestures, these 
abstract diagrams, organise the world more geometrico, giving it a new 
meaning, subjecting it to a rigorous conceptualisation.1  
In an audacious analogy to Euclid’s, Galileo proposes the principle of inertia, 
a fundamental principle of conservation of the quantity of motion in physics: a 
uniform movement of a material point on a Euclidean straight line, physically 
unachievable, the external limit of all movements, since no perfect inertial 
movement exists. But precisely because he places himself outside all real 
movements, Galileo succeeds in making them all intelligible at a stroke, 
identifying what they have in common at the limit, and at the same time what 
modifies this limiting state – gravitation, friction – in the experiences with falling 
objects or on the inclined plane (ibid.). 
Galileo’s principle is therefore “at the limit”, asymptotic, and was further 
made possible by that naturalisation of infinity that was characteristic of the 
Italian Renaissance (Arasse 1999; S. Longo 2010; G. Longo 2011). It is a 
mathematical principle, in the sense in which mathematics and physics, making 
 
1 A meaning, the origin of which can be traced in the figures drawn only with outlines at the dawn of our 
figurative humanity, in the caves of Lascaux. 
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use of limiting principles ad infinitum, render geometric forms and movements 
of finite and material bodies intelligible. From Aristotle to Galileo, in physics, 
trajectories were studied “per se”, without a mathematical space which might 
conceptually precede them. Only after Descartes, and then Newton, was a 
geometry of space gradually constructed. This perfectly empty space pre-exists 
trajectories. From the epistemological point of view, the intellectual potency of 
mathematics, from Greek myth to today, its interweaving with Myth, theology 
and the formation of scientific thought, is beyond doubt. The various forms of 
Platonism still fashionable in the philosophy of mathematics, which claim to be 
secular, on the contrary remain immersed in theology, refusing to make that 
critical and historical “sidestep” that is necessary for epistemological reflection. 
The intellectual potency of mathematics, its positioning of itself as a science at 
and of the limit, initiates bold steps which organise the world, rendering it thus, 
in their own way, intelligible. Borders without thickness impose themselves on 
objects; the thickness of bodies (the pictorial perspective with its vanishing 
point tending towards infinity) becomes visible on flat surfaces, framing 
movement by means of non-existent inertial trajectories, subsequently 
immersed in an absolute, Newtonian, pre-given space. 
But what is the relationship between the idea of a border without thickness 
and the concreteness of the thing manifested in experience? Let us try to 
rediscover its meaning by following a thread among the ideas of Husserl. Line 
and limit also play a crucial role in a philosophy of experience that is radical and 
at the same time rational, such as Husserl’s, in which the two concepts prove to 
be profoundly and inextricably connected. It is the line that allows the object to 
have a perimeter, making possible the manifestation of that which is given. It is 
always the line which, indicating the limits to extension, allows the object to be 
detached from the background and fragmented. Line, the priority of extension, 
and determination (this last linked to localisation) constitute a cluster of 
reciprocally sustaining notions. Determination, phenomenologically conceived 
as an invariant in variation, is what enables the establishment of distinct 
properties in objects. On the other hand, conceiving of determination as 
invariant entails the attribution of ontological primacy to extension at the 
expense of qualitative “filling”. Extension, thanks to the homogeneity which it 
imposes, is what enables things to appear: indeed, without extension the 
phenomenon would be destined to lose its own boundaries or borders, thereby 
nullifying its own phenomenological status. Moreover, extension is what 
enables the object to be sub-divided into parts. 
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There belongs to the essence of extension the ideal possibility of fragmentation. 
It is then evident that every fragmentation of the extension fragments the thing 
itself—i.e., splits it into pieces, each of which once again has the full thingly 
character, that of material thingness. Conversely, every partition of the thing into 
things, every fragmentation, as such, of the thing, also fragments the extension 
of the thing (Husserl, 1912-29/1989: 33). 
 
It is a distinguishing characteristic of extension to point towards an ideal 
limit. This possibility constitutes one of the central points in the argument about 
the indirect mathematization of the plena which Husserl proposes in Krisis 
(Husserl 1937/1970). According to this argument, the plena – in essence 
inexact, vague, morphological – cannot be directly geometrised or 
mathematised. The reason consists in the fact that there is no possibility of a 
plenum tending towards an ideal limit: unlike form (and therefore extension) 
which can in themselves be idealized (the sliding scale of the more or less 
straight, the more or less flat, the more or less circular implies the possibility of 
rendering the straight still straighter in a tendency towards the infinite). In 
reducing the sensible thing to mere extension, Galileo (who “is at once a 
discovering and a concealing genius [entdeckender und verdeckender Genius]” 
(1937/1970: 51) hides the effective nature of the thing experienced, a nature 
which Husserl calls morphological, vague, fluid, more suited to the description 
of botany than of geometry. Indeed, botany refers to its own object of study “in 
the empirically vague sense in which, in ordinary life, one speaks of sharp points 
and corners as opposed to blunt or ever rounded ones. Plainly the essential 
forms of all intuitive data are not in principle to be brought under ‘exact’ or 
‘ideal' notions, such as we have in mathematics” (Husserl 1900-1/ 2001: 15) 
 The concepts which come closest to the sensible thing are concepts with 
rough outlines. 
The most perfect geometry and the most perfect practical mastery of it cannot 
enable the descriptive natural scientist to express (in exact geometrical 
concepts) what he expresses in such a simple, understandable, and completely 
appropriate manner by the words “notches”, “scalloped”, “lens-shaped”, 
“umbrelliform”, and the like - all to them concepts which are essentially, rather 
than accidentally, inexact and consequently also non-mathematical (Husserl 
1913/1983: 166).  
 
Galileo’s ploy consists in disembodying and emptying one of the 
disembodied parts, and finally declaring its independence, creating that ideal 
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clothing which the object will finally put on, in view of a physicalization of 
ontology, in which the colours, sounds, weight, and heat radiation of a body that 
warms nearby bodies are transformed into luminous, sonic, calorific vibrations: 
that is, into forms. Nevertheless, there is a crucial aspect which Husserl shares 
with Galileo: considering extension as the essential characteristic of the material 
object, as opposed to the inessentiality of sensible qualification. It is extension 
which permits the object to be “something”; it is onto extension that the plena 
spread themselves. Movement itself, inseparable from the moved body, becomes 
an additional, or integrating, component of an extension (it is impossible to form 
“abstract ideas”, to separate the idea, e.g. of a movement, from that of a moving 
body (Husserl 2001:6). 
Therefore, phenomenology, as an inexact science, is not a geometry of 
phenomena. The presence of the plena, and the impossibility of their tending 
towards an ideal limit, renders phenomenology fluid, morphological, vague. The 
comparison between phenomenology and botany is, as we have seen, sanctioned 
by Husserl himself. Nevertheless, inexactness does not exclude determination 
but, on the contrary, in certain respects guarantees it. Determination, invariant 
in variation, in fact implies the ontological primacy (although not the 
exhaustiveness) of extension. 
If exactness is the domain of geometry, which proceeds through idealizations 
and the perfect deducibility of each singularity from general assumptions; 
determination (although not pre-determination) is the essential feature of 
phenomenology. For Husserl, experience is essentially and before all else 
experience of things, and being a thing means being determined: that is, 
delimited, delineated. In considering the sensible plena as residual, line and 
surface are foregrounded, giving priority to the static and spatial dimension at 
the expense of the dynamic and temporal dimension (Lanfredini 2015).  
2.  Time and history 
The bold and constitutive gesture of imposing borders to contain and delimit 
objects, is complemented by a conception of matter as a residue, a conception 
which arises from the privileging of the formal dimension over the material, a 
positioning that is so general as to take on the guise of a paradigmatic system. 
This is a logic of the residue (Lanfredini 2016a) of which there are many 
illustrations: for example, the distinction between quanta and qualia in 
philosophy of mind; between form and content in philosophy of knowledge, and 
42  Humana.Mente – Issue 31 – December 2016 
  
as an exemplary case, the notion of information, with its claim to have freed itself 
entirely from the material substratum. 
Moreover, interesting analyses of the visual centres in the cerebral cortex 
show how the brain extracts borders from, or rather imposes them on, objects 
(Sarti et al. 2008): the primary cortex seems to be activated along outlines and 
borders. Retention and protention of a trajectory, the primary gestures of 
action, further contribute to organizing the world in continuous lines, in 
Gestalts which structure vision, at least in animals with a fovea and brain similar 
to ours (Longo, Montévil 2014). These are structures which, in setting up the 
concepts of line and border as foundational, enable us to think of conditions in 
which knowledge is possible. The cerebral traces relating to outlines are 
concerned with the original frictions between us and the world, those same 
frictions which ensure that our mathematical propositions, language, writing are 
not arbitrary. These are organizing principles of the real, instruments for the 
praxis of knowledge, which have shamed our scientific method, and with it our 
universe, permitting us to look at it from the limit of the world of things. Only at 
the mathematical limit, outside the physical world, can a theory of surfaces or 
space be made, capturing the inert with such unequalled expressive and 
cognitive power. But these passages to the limit, stretching to its extreme the a-
historical invariance of the inert (the principles of energy and momentum, for 
example), collide when they have to capture the historicity and variability of the 
living thing. The immaterial and mathematically invariant characteristics of the 
conceptual universe thus constructed, which are of great, but reasonable, force 
and efficacy in mathematics and physics (strong even from their mythical and 
theological origins), are inadequate in biology. 
As if to supply the inadequacy of this asymptotic character of the 
mathematical forms of the inert, biologists have turned to a different 
environment in search of foundations and instruments of intelligibility, albeit 
one that is mathematical in origin: the instructive theories of arithmetical 
calculus and numerical algorithms. The notion of information has seemed 
sufficiently capable of enriching the mathematics of physics, supplementing its 
notions with a limit of energy and quantity of motion (inertia) or of entropy and 
“field”: these are limits because either they delimit conservation – the first two 
– or because they are syntheses of asymptotic transitions, like entropy in the 
statistical physics of Boltzmann or the field originating with Maxwell (their 
properties, the irreversibility of entropy and the coherence of the field, are given 
at the limit). 
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So, in biology, the myth of the computational alphanumeric datum has 
become the alternative theoretical heart to the geometrical reign of 
mathematics, giving rise to particularly serious distortions. This century has 
been marked by a vision of DNA as “instructive”, as data and instructions which 
completely regulate ontogeny, genes which propagate such data in the course of 
the evolution of species independently of the materiality of the cell and the 
organisms, which are regarded as mere “avatars” of the digital information 
(Gouyon, Henry and Arnaud, 2002). Since the 1950s, genetics has been 
dominated by alphabetical, intrinsically linear (one-dimensional) scripts such as 
every digital code, lists of complete (and egotistical) instructions for ontogeny 
(and phylogeny) and, for both the living thing and for mankind, the sense of 
one’s body and one’s own space. In biology the notions of information and of 
program are metaphors which limit the complexity of the living thing (Longo et 
al., 2012; Soto, Longo, 2016). Program and information enjoy an 
independence from coding, from (Cartesian) dimensions, and from the material 
(hardware), in that this independence is based on properties of rigorous 
mathematical invariance, on a radical, formal dualism. The evolutionary dynamic 
of genetic information is independent of the biological body, which is only a 
contingent material realisation of it (an avatar). In other words, the biological 
body becomes a mere material and theoretically irrelevant vehicle (hardware), 
like hardware in information theory (Gouyon, Henry and Arnaud 2002); 
whereas in biology there is only the concrete and historical materiality of this 
DNA, these membranes, these bodies, in their dimensions and no others. 
Therefore, in genetics the notions of information and program can only remain 
“soft”, vague, lacking in rigour, even if they have extremely potent 
consequences. Indeed, the living thing only exists in this material – DNA, RNA, 
membranes – and nothing else: no informational invariant can be extracted from 
it for use in another physical material. So mathematical notions of invariance 
cannot be rigorously used in relation to codification, to realization in matter 
(hardware) that are at the heart of both the theory of the elaboration of 
information (Turing) and the theory of the transmission of information 
(Shannon). So, with vague reference to notions of common sense drawn from 
information and programming, highly potent biological properties are derived, 
first among them the so-called “stereospecificity” of biological macromolecules: 
these dovetail together exactly into each other through exact physico-chemical 
correspondences, like the correspondence between key and lock. Or rather: 
Necessarily stereospecific molecular interactions explain the structure of the 
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code … a boolean algebra, like in computers … The cell is …[and] the molecular 
processes are a Cartesian Mechanism, autonomous, exact, independent from 
external influences … (Monod, 1970) 
biological specificity … is entirely … in complementary combining regions on 
the interacting molecules (Pauling, 1987) 
So, in biology, far beyond the dynamics of the inert, a conceptual universe of 
the calculable has been forged – linear and decidable, apart from occasional 
“noise”: “Evolution originates in noise, imperfections …” (Monod, 1970). 
Following (Longo, Montévil, Kauffman, 2012), we on the contrary see in 
biology the necessity to break the a priori framing of all dynamic possibilities 
within a pre-given space-time or, more generally, in a pre-established space of 
observables and parameters (a “space of phases”), as is done in any theory of 
physics. The living thing has a history, and not only a time of dynamics and 
processes, even if these are irreversible, in a pre-given mathematical space. 
Historical time is marked by the change in the observables (phenotypes, 
organisms) and in the relevant parameters and by “rare events” (Longo, 2017) 
This places biological unpredictability, and its time, far beyond that of physics 
(which is the unpredictability of a trajectory in a pre-given space), situating it at 
the level of the necessary space of possibilities. In short, in evolutionary time, 
but also in ontogenetic time, the species and the organism co-construct their 
own dynamic and the ecosystem. They construct (“create”) organs and 
ecological niches, new species. Speciation, for example, is often due to the rare 
occurrence of a “hopeful monster” which finds or constructs a niche which 
makes it possible (Longo et al., 2012). The grave failure to appreciate this 
essential biological unpredictability (creativity) consists in having neglected a 
fundamental factor for the materiality of the living thing: its historicity (Longo, 
2017). 
3. How the Future Depends on Past Histories 
An epistemology based on the inert has the following among its meta-theoretical 
assumptions: 
1. Privileging fixity over movement (and thereby finding ideas, universals, 
essences in fixity) 
In that it is assigned the role of preparing and directing our action on things, 
intelligence divides, breaks, allocates. In the predominant culture, intelligence 
is most easily applied to fixed points; consequently, fixity and immobility are 
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what our intelligence seeks. This operation of parcelling out is customarily also 
applied to time, which is transformed from duration (the essence of which is to 
pass, in the sense that none of its parts is present at the arrival of the next) into 
succession, intervals, or moments: that is, virtual arrests of time. What emerges 
from this is a special conception of time in which the concept of “juxtaposition” 
is replaced by that of “succession”. Intelligence wants always to be concerned 
with immobilities, real or possible. Space-time is nothing but a practical 
surrogate of time and movement, useful insofar as it is able to bend itself to the 
demands of language and calculation. In reality, movement is not a series of 
positions, nor the mutating of a series of states. Time is not a succession like the 
sequence of images in a film: real evolution, however slightly it is accelerated or 
slowed, is a radical modification. We could even say that it is precisely in 
acceleration or slowing that time consists. 
1) It is therefore possible to replace assumption 1) with the following: 
Time is not lack of stability and fixity (of the idea, of the universal, of essence, 
etc.). Time is effective – that is, creative (we will try to say what we mean by this). 
There is a second meta-theoretical assumption which, in an epistemology of 
the inert, stands beside and completes the first. 
2) Privileging the given over duration 
«Time - says Bergson - is what hinders everything from being given at once. 
It retards, or rather is retardation» (1938/1946: 108). The fact that time 
prevents everything being given at once leads us to replace the idea of the 
created (the already given) with that of a unceasing creation. This also justifies 
the cryptic nature of the second sentence: time delays, or rather is delay. 
Because time, understood as duration and not as spatialized time (or, if we wish, 
as time of the living thing and not as time of the inorganic), is principally a the 
virtual projection of the past into the present, as we shall shortly see. 
Assumption 2) can therefore be replaced by the following: 
2) Time is not given, but ongoing 
The past is not understood as a reservoir or warehouse on which memory can 
draw, fishing here and there for events, experiences, data, etc. Duration is, on 
the contrary, the incessant progress of the past which undermines the future and 
which increases as it progresses, conserving itself indefinitely, thus making “an 
avalanche of itself” (ibid).  
Having recourse to the notion of duration gets us back in touch with the 
dynamic, temporal structure of the flux of phenomenological consciousness, 
articulated in three motions: retention of the past, the actual present, and 
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protention towards the future. For Husserl, there is no reality that is not 
temporal, which introduces the essential factor of memory and of the 
relationship between memory and perception. For Husserl (as for Bergson) 
memory is not a simple placing of past data in some “drawer” or “ledger” of our 
consciousness, and perception is not a purely instantaneous state, a source of 
data which, then slipping into memory, are gradually eclipsed by the horizon of 
the consciousness. Perception is not mere instantaneousness, not purely 
present consciousness, but an act which entails a certain duration. This means 
that every present “now” is ceaselessly transformed into a retention, thus 
producing a continuum in which each successive moment is retention of each 
preceding moment: a sort of comet whose tail consists of the “wake” or 
indistinct halo of the retentions (Husserl 1893-1917/1991: 89). The comet’s 
tail is what provides the original impression (the present) with its necessary 
adumbrations (Abschattungen): every actuality that has duration is thus 
perceived distinctly in its original impression, to pour out later into retention 
until it blurs and finally collapses into the past. However, there are two ways of 
reading this temporal articulation, a difference which can be attributed to a 
difference of emphasis. In the first, that of Husserl, the emphasis is placed on the 
present, according to the following schema:  
retention  present  protention 
For Husserl, “consciousness is nothing without impression” (ibid, 
Appendix I: 163) and so-called adequate perception is the continuous passing, 
in consciousness, of the present into retention; a passing which, in the 
perception of the now (the head of the comet), finds that absolute “source” 
which enables continuous, unitary and indivisible progress, made possible by 
the restraining action of the retentional consciousness. If it is true that in lived 
time every now-point always and necessarily becomes mediated by its own 
retentional wake, it is also true that there is no retention that is not rooted in a 
now, exactly as every tail can only be the wake from the head of a comet. 
The original impression, the present, the now, are the necessary fulcrum 
without which duration cannot unfold. By doing this, Husserl once again 
identifies form, in this case a temporal form, a linear or horizontal continuity 
between retention, original impression and protention, which ideally (and 
metaphorically) unfolds itself into a “surface”, a swimmer in the temporal 
current, passing through its entire extension exactly as a swimmer would do. 
In the second, that of Bergson, the emphasis is placed instead on the past, 
according to the schema:  
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retention  present  protention 
In Husserl we can speak of the primacy of the impressional consciousness, 
or of the given. The now holds back its own past. But for Bergson the primacy 
belongs to retention. It is not the present that restrains, but the past which flows 
onto the present. The former approach privileges the life of consciousness 
(presence); the second privileges the life of the organism (the phylo- and onto-
genetic horizon), in respect of which consciousness is only one possible 
derivation. 
The two ways of understanding time also imply two ways of conceiving the 
relations between perception and memory: in the first case, there is only a 
difference of degree between perception and memory (memory as a trace of the 
perception, without which it could not subsist); in the second case, there is a 
difference not of degree but of kind between memory and perception 
(independence of memory from perception and consciousness). In the first case 
the present is constitutive; in the second it is history that is constitutive. 
History is irrelevant in most theories of physics, whereas it is central to 
biology. If the understanding of physical dynamics, or the determination of the 
system under examination, even for the purposes of prediction (albeit purely in 
probabilistic terms), is given by the present situation, the understanding of a 
biological dynamic is given by its history. The past and the sense of the future 
play a crucial role in living systems, contributing to their intrinsic 
unpredictability. 
Mathematical determination does not mean foreseeability. This outcome has 
been well known since Poincaré and was later reinforced by quantum mechanics. 
Nevertheless, in physico-mathematical systems, a pre-determined space of 
phases enables us to define the equations or the functions of evolution on the 
basis of the (relative) knowledge of the present. In order to write equations, it is 
necessary to set the relevant parameters and the observables: that is, the space 
of the phases. We could sum this up by saying that, faced with a superseding of 
foreseeability, determination continues to play a fundamental role in the physics 
of the inert, via the crucial notions of invariance and symmetry, or via principles 
of conservation in spaces of the pre-given phases. Instead, Darwin’s first 
principle, “descent with modification”, must be read as a principle of “non-
conservation of the phenotype” in the hereditary processes of evolution (Soto, 
Longo, 2016). Or rather, evolution (and selection) are possible because in 
every reproduction, large or small, there is variation, a breaking, however slight, 
of symmetry (Longo, Montévil, 2014). The space of the phenotypes, organisms, 
48  Humana.Mente – Issue 31 – December 2016 
  
species, which are the relevant observables, changes constantly, even if 
minutely, at each reproduction (sometimes in a radical way, when the “hopeful 
monster” becomes viable). This suggests the impossibility of transferring the 
physico-mathematical concept of laws to the dynamics of biology and, a fortiori, 
to those of cognition. This is a “negative result” (Longo 2010) which 
nevertheless opens the way to the positive (constructive, creative) role of history 
in the understanding of living systems. If, in physics, mathematical 
determination allows a probability to be assigned to future outcomes 
(probabilistic analysis is made possible by the fact that the trajectories, although 
unpredictable, nevertheless move within spaces of the given phases), the 
continual breaking of symmetry in biological dynamics (Longo, Montévil 2014) 
does not permit the application of a similar formalization. The impossibility of 
determining a space for the pre-defined phases is given by the efficacy of history: 
the unpredictability is no longer within a pre-determined space of the phases, 
but applies to the very constitution of the space of the phases, which constantly 
changes on the basis of the (often unknown and inaccessible) contexts of the 
past. This puts at risk not only predictability or pre-determination, but also 
determination of a physico-mathematical kind, and does in fact make it the case 
that causality in biology cannot, in general, be associated with, or replaced by, a 
measure of probability. 
(Relative) invariance as viable stability of living organisms and their (relative) 
autonomy is therefore not static but dynamic, indeed evolutionary, founded on 
an incessant reconstruction of components (Montévil, Mossio 2015; Mossio et 
al., 2016) and on the adaptation of the organism to its environment. Hence it 
seems possible to identify two senses of invariance: a static invariance in 
variation, in which the notions of datum, determination and categorization play 
a fundamental role, and an invariance in transformation, evolutionary and 
relational, path-dependent and for this reason endowed with historical time. 
Only the second type of invariance describes the living thing’s variability and 
flexibility, its resilience: that is, the peculiar type of changing structural stability 
which characterises biology, differentiating it from physics and mathematics. In 
mathematics an invariant is completely known or defined when the class of 
transformations and spaces on which these act is completely defined and known 
(eg. a straight line can be defined as an axis of rotation – that is, as the invariant 
of a group of symmetries; principles of conservation, or rather symmetries, 
which permit the definition of each physical trajectory, even those of quantum 
mechanics: Schrödinger’s equation derives from a form of the Hamiltonian, an 
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expression of a principle of conservation of energy). Instead the invariant in 
biology is relational, depends on the context, and is based on retentions 
(restraining the past) and protentions (openness to the future, ever-mutable 
reactivation of a continuously reinterpreted past). Moreover, in mathematics 
and physics the invariant is attributable to a perfectly stable (formal) definition, 
since its objects are generic; in biology, on the contrary, the structural stability 
of an organism (or of an organ, or a population) concerns specific objects and, 
as such, is not formal.2 Stability in biology is closely connected to memory 
(whether understood as a physico-chemical trace of the past – DNA for example 
– or, in cognition, as unconscious retention or conscious memory) and to its 
capacity for selecting what is relevant and forgetting, losing track of, what is 
irrelevant for the purposes of action3. Retention (present in the most elementary 
animal movement) is what permits the constitution of an invariant (biological or 
cognitive) that is preserved in the contextual transformations: the restraining of 
what is relevant for action permits the action to be reiterated in modified 
contexts, even if they are partly similar. In this sense, memory is interpretation, 
as the use of DNA by a cell is contextual, hence “interpretative”. 
In short, biological systems cannot be considered “systems determined by 
the state” like those of physics, since the course of history which results in the 
present state plays an essential role in the determination of the future (Longo, 
2017). Biological determination therefore produces unforeseeable dynamics 
which cannot be ascribed to equations or to the assigning of probabilities in 
spaces of possible pre-givens. Evolutionary paths are by no means analysable as 
geodetic trajectories in a predefined space of phases, and hence become 
“creative” or “inventive”. The relatively invariant traces of the past are at the 
same time the product and producer of the permanent reconstruction of a 
relatively stable and locally invariant structure. Protention, founded on 
retention, is an always mutable form of reactivation of a continually 
reinterpreted past that is often inaccessible to our consciousness. 
 
2 Physics operates with generic objects (interchangeable, invariant objects of theory and experience) which 
nevertheless move along specific (geodetic) trajectories. By contrast biological objects (organisms) are not 
generic but specific (historical and individuated) and their trajectories are generic (possible evolutionary and 
ontogenetic paths): see (Bailly, Longo, 2006/2011; Longo, Montévil, 2014). 
3 DNA can be considered a fundamental chemico-physical trace of an organism’s evolutionary history, 
used by each cell in the course of ontogenesis. Like any other component of life, the functions of DNA 
can be understood only in a way that relates them to a context or an ecosystem. DNA does not by any 
means contain the complete determination of an organism. It is only the relatively stable invariant which 
is formed and maintained over time through various different contexts. 
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These key concepts of the trajectory of life that we propose are: enablement 
(the continual variations suggest what is to be eliminated or made possible in a 
co-constituted environment – Longo, Montévil, Kauffman, 2012); evolutionary 
heredity with co-variations (the phylogenetic and ontogenetic pathways are the 
permanent constitution of organic unity as a structure whose coherence is 
maintained during and thanks to change); extended criticality – Bailly, Longo, 
2006/2011; Longo, Montévil 2014 – (extending the physicists’ notion of 
critical transition of phase to the permanent reconstruction, through duration, 
of a coherence of structure with new symmetries). Variability, adaptation and 
diversity are all elements which contribute to biological stability understood as 
relative invariant.4 In biology, invariance is neither exact nor permanent, and 
conceptual and historical instability is essential for relative stability by means of 
the variation of organisms and species, adaptation and the emergence of new 
diversities. It thus becomes impossible to determine completely the structure 
and the function of an organism or of one of its components, in that they arise 
not only from current relationships but also from the history of past ones, with a 
view to the constitution of future meanings. 
4. Rethinking the living thing with new categories 
In order to place such key categories in a unified framework, we need new 
categories. We have said, for example, that between memory and perception 
there is a difference of kind and not of degree, and that memory is independent 
of perception and consciousness. But what does difference of kind mean? If the 
notion of degree, or of gradation, is connected to the two concepts of distinction 
and identity (we take gradation to be the same thing as distinct intensity), the 
difference in kind is not concerned with the same thing, but precisely with 
different things. Difference of kind and difference of degree correspond 
respectively – at least in part – to discrete multiplicity on the one hand, and 
 
4 Not that Gould’s exaptation (Gould 1982) and Jacob’s bricolage (Jacob 1981) are only 
comprehensible if we distance ourselves from the myth of evolution as optimalization (Goldenfeld, 
Woese 2011), emphasizing Gould’s exaptation (ex-post adaptation) and the functional “overloading” 
of organs (Longo, 2017). The human brain and hand are typical examples of this. Hands are good, but 
not “optimal”, for grasping tree branches (the thumb is not perfectly opposable), but this is precisely 
why hands can also be used for giving caresses and for playing the piano. If an organ had been planned 
to be “optimal” in an activity (optimality would contribute to “fitness”), it would be difficult to make use 
of it for other purposes. We could even go so far as to maintain that an “optimal” (perfect) organism is 
dead. Only a crystal or a diamond can be perfect.  
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continuous multiplicity on the other (Riemann). The latter resemble duration to 
the extent that, as Deleuze affirms, they are that which can only be divided by 
changing its nature, which lets itself be measured by varying the principle of 
measurement at every stage of its division, whereas discrete multiplicities 
contain the principle of their measurement. Furthermore, discrete multiplicity 
foresees the intervention of the void (whose power of negation is essential in 
order to be able to make distinctions), and which is something that does not arise 
through continuous multiplicity. Lastly, in continuous multiplicity any form of 
reduction (understood in a general sense as the re-attribution of certain orders 
of phenomena back to the laws of another order of phenomena) is impracticable. 
The discrete multiple is concerned with exteriority, simultaneity, 
juxtaposition, order, quantitative difference or difference of degree, distinction, 
discontinuity, actuality, making space for a homogeneous multiplicity. The 
qualitative multiple is concerned with interiority, with what is divided only by 
changing its nature and for this very reason does not produce movement, but is 
movement, fusion, heterogeneity, qualitative discrimination, virtual or 
continuous multiplicity irreducible to number (ibid.). But what “continuum”? 
The phenomenal continuum, that of intuition, or a specific mathematical 
construction? 
In Das Kontinuum (1918), H. Weyl underlined the inadequacy of the 
construction of a continuum made of points, as proposed by Cantor and 
Dedekind for the mathematization of time. He acknowledged that we have no 
better one and resigned himself to working with it; but during those years he in 
fact contributed to the relativistic mathematics of space-time, in which the unity 
between space and time was not only given by the common use of the Cantorian 
continuum, but also by the fact that the Lorentz-Poincaré transformations, 
which leave the laws of physics unvaried in response to a change in the system of 
reference, apply in a similar way to space and to time. Nevertheless, he insisted 
that this mathematization of time is wholly inadequate, because no “present 
point” exists: when we try to isolate it, it is no longer there, but is instead en 
route between past and future, in the coexistence of Husserl’s arrows which 
correlate the present to the past and to the future.5  
 
5 Today there exist continuous spaces “without points”, in highly abstract topoi with which some people 
are trying to do physics, following Grothendieck's approach. It is difficult to say if the difficulties that 
are being encountered are only due to the conceptual force of the Cantorian continuum, to the 
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So we must think of two forms of continuum, spatial and temporal, while also 
maintaining the distinction between temporal and spatial order, as well as in the 
play between discrete and continuous. The first form is concerned with space 
and the second with time, understood as duration. In duration no reduction is 
possible (there is no biunivocal correspondence which may allow reduction to 
its own sub-grouping), nor is there any reiterability or reversibility. The two 
multiplicities lead to two profoundly different conceptions of matter: the first 
(the discrete) describes matter susceptible to being partitioned, objectified, 
potentially capable of being subdivided and reconstituted ad infinitum, but 
lacking virtuality, in which everything is characterized as actual. Matter, 
understood as objective matter, is both that which is divided and that which 
being divided does not change its own nature. Then there is a second meaning 
of matter, not objective but qualitative, not divisible into parts and capable of 
reconstitution, endowed with a thrust which leads it to be differentiated 
indefinitely; matter linked to duration more than to the object, to time more than 
to space, understood as extended space; matter that is not only actual, but 
virtual, in which the virtual becomes foundational and the actual an abstraction 
of the virtual. Indeed, the virtual is the difference of kind which becomes actual, 
only once fixed as difference of degree. Identity and distinction are therefore 
abstractions, particular cases of that difference of kind which, if “stopped” 
present themselves as differences of degree. Thus, identity and distinction are 
nothing but difference at zero degrees.  
Qualitative multiplicity proceeds from the virtual to its actualization, along 
lines of differentiation which, before “precipitating” in an actual that is given 
from time to time (distinct, objective, decomposable), proceed temporally in a 
way that is continuous, heterogeneous and simple (that is, not divisible). Space 
thus becomes a particular instance of time: not absence of movement, but 
presence of movement in its form of stasis, actualization, repetition.6  
The articulation which emerges as central is that between virtual and actual. 
It outlines an ontology of a temporal character, contrary to the distinction 
 
immensity of the mathematics done in it and the difficulty of “exporting” them, or to the inadequacy of 
these ideas in the representation of time, see (Longo, 2015) for references. 
 
6  This radically modifies the principle of causality, converting it into what Bergson calls “the retrograde 
movement of the true”. Its causes are always obtained retroactively by starting from the product. The 
principle of causality, and the rule that the same events always follow the same causes, is furthermore 
founded on divisibility, reversibility and reiterability of events, and hence on the collapse of differences 
of kind into differences of degee. Real duration is nevertheless neither reiterable nor reversible.    
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between possible and real, which implies an ontology of a spatial type. The 
possible is that which is realized (or not realized), the virtual is that which is 
actualized. The process of realization is subject to the two fundamental rules of 
likeness and limitation (or elimination). Since the possible is what has not 
occurred but which could occur, possible and real stand on the same logical 
plane or, put another way, from the point of view of the concept, there is not 
difference between real and possible. In this sense the real is realized as an image 
and likeness of the possible: in fact, all it possesses in addition are existence and 
reality. Furthermore, since not all possibles are realized, realization implies a 
limitation which “repels” or “prevents” certain possibles, making others “pass” 
into the real. The virtual does not proceed through limitation or elimination in 
order to actualize itself, but through creation; not through likeness, but through 
difference (or divergence). If the real is realized as an image and likeness of the 
possible, constituting a prolongation of it, in the sense of projection, the actual 
does not at all resemble the virtuality which it incarnates, constituting a 
prolongation of it in the sense of creation. In this sense, contrary to the 
relationship between possible and real, in the virtual there is full coexistence of 
past and present: the evolution of life is the continuous explication of the vital 
impulse, Darwin’s “reproduction with variations”, more “motility” as the 
“default state” of the living thing (Soto, Longo 2016), starting from the gigantic 
virtual memory, from that dark temporal depth which corresponds to 
phylogenetic development and precedes the ontogenetic (Bergson 
1911/1944). Beneath the solidified crust of extension, thought is thus able to 
grasp the value of tendency as impulse, as qualitative unfolding. 
What the qualitative conception of matter urges to do is to have faith not so 
much in what is “given”, so much as in the underlying force or impulse. Things 
are not so much the effects of causes as expressions of tendencies. In the passage 
from discrete to continuous, moreover, the idea of boundaries falls profoundly 
silent: the boundaries of an entity in fact coincide with the boundaries from 
which the next entity begins, which makes impossible an exact subdivision of 
objects into their parts. 
Virtual vs actual, difference, tendency, impulse, friction, creation, 
qualitative unfolding, etc. are some expressions for a new philosophical 
dictionary, aimed at rethinking the living thing and, more generally, the 
relationship between science and philosophy. 
The intention is not so much to destroy the quantitative scientific paradigm, 
as to integrate it with new categories of thought. 
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